As well as providing an analysis of how financial stability could be sustained through the appropriate targeting of policy instruments at debt gearing, this paper aims to provide an overview of the respective roles which governments and shareholders could assume in deterring financial institutions from overly relying on certain policy measures (role of governments) and in reducing tax burdens on tax payers (role of shareholders). The duration of the recent Crisis has also witnessed the introduction of mechanisms aimed at bailing-in financial institutions -rather than merely bailing them out.
Introduction
Whilst central banks have assumed more prominent, extended and innovative roles since the onset of the recent Financial Crisis, the importance of the respective roles assumed by shareholders and governments in relation to the recapitalisation of financial institutions and the facilitation of exit strategies (particularly exit strategies from non standard policy measures), have also been brought to light.
According to Weber, the monetary policy response of the Eurozone, when compared to that of the United States, is principally attributed to the following factors: 2 i) In contrast to the U.S financial system, banks play a dominant role in funding euro area non financial corporations -hence the explanation to why the Eurosystem's response to the Crisis has focussed on measures aimed at enabling liquidity-constrained banks to mitigate their short term funding gaps (eventually sustaining the ability of the banking sector to lend to the real economy) -"the enhanced credit support approach". allotment policy (mechanisms aimed at addressing bail outs) as well as policies and mechanisms which could be implemented by governments to mitigate situations whereby financial institutions, who despite improved financial market conditions, continue to depend on the full allotment policy (the bail-in strategic aspect). This aspect will also incorporate the role of shareholders as the first resort during the impending collapse of a financial institution. The third section will then provide a brief analysis of the policy response measures adopted in the U.S during the recent Financial Crisis before a conclusion is drawn.
A. The Eurozone: From the Variable Rate Tender to Full Allotment.
The liquidity needs of the banking system in the Euro area, it is stated 4 , are principally attributable to non banks' demands for bank notes and substantial remunerated reserve requirements.
Factors which culminated in the introduction of the full allotment policy which "allowed banks to accumulate substantial amounts of surplus liquidity -which could be lent to other banks or placed in the Eurosystem's deposit facility (an overnight facility used to deposit excess reserves)" are as follows: The most obvious solution relating to the weaning off of financial institutions would appear to be the introduction of exit strategies which would compel overly reliant financial institutions to withdraw from such allotment policies. Incentives which could serve in encouraging such financial institutions to withdraw from such policies, could accompany such exit strategies in the form of lower interest rate deals and packages to be offered to financial institutions -the level of such interest rates being dependent on the length of period during which such financial institutions applied for such liquidity assistance (that is, the degree to which interests rates are reduced for such institutions will increase proportionately to how quickly such institutions withdraw from continued dependence on liquidity assistance and other policies implemented to assist them during periods of financial difficulties).
The Recapitalisation Communication also states that "in facilitating exit strategies, member States may also consider using a restrictive dividend policy to ensure the temporary character of State intervention." In relation to the mitigation of situations whereby financial institutions -who despite improved financial market conditions, continue to depend on the full allotment policy, the satisfaction of stipulated criteria and requirements relating to the level and quality of capital (for purposes aimed at ensuring loss absorbency) should serve as a pre requisite before such full allotment policies are granted to financial institutions who apply for these. The loss absorbency of capital will be approached under the headings below: "Conversion/Write offs" Whereby debt instruments are transferred into "higher quality and common equity capital with better loss absorption characteristics -with the result that the institution's ability to withstand further losses is consolidated." 7 -Debt regarded as bank capital should be converted to stock or written off in a crisis -hence compelling bond investors to bear some of the cost of future bail outs.
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-All regulatory capital instruments sold by banks should be capable of absorbing losses if the company is unable to fund itself -before taxpayers' cash is plundered into rescuing a lender, so-called contingent capital should be converted into equity or written off.
9
Benefits of the Basel Committee's Proposals which are aimed at "ensuring the loss absorbency of regulatory capital at the point of non viability" include -The discouragement excessive risk taking (since investors will not be encouraged to buy securities under the assumption that they will avoid losses in the event of a bank failure). -The reduction of the need for government bailouts owing to the requirement that contingent capital be converted (to equity or written off) to fund rescues rather than taxpayers solely bearing the cost. Hence bond investors of a bank will serve as the first resort during the impending collapse of a bank.
Two mechanisms which are considered to be instrumental in the achievement of the goal of managing failing financial institutions -as well as the re capitalisation of institutions (without the need for capital support from governments and tax payers have been proposed: 10 -1) The Bail In Mechanism : Whose implementation commences when a firm reaches a predefined trigger -which would re-capitalise a firm as a going concern (through the conversion of selected levels of unsecured debt to common equity). Since no shareholder or creditor consultation is considered to be necessary, a swift implementation of its operation is expected.
-2) Contingent Capital: Whose implementation has been undertaken historically by the insurance sector and which serves as a provision for one-time losses. It is issued in the form of notes which are convertible into equity as soon as a pre-defined trigger is attained by the issuer. Since it requires no regulatory involvement, transparency is enhanced -such transparency serving as a potential means in helping to prevent localised problems from triggering into a full blown systemic crisis."
"Because hedge funds have so much lower gearing, or leverage than banks, they have been able to absorb much bigger falls in asset values."
11
According to Miles, 12 the short term nominal interest rate is a very blunt instrument to implement in attempting to limit the gearing of financial institutions. Furthermore, he argues that capital requirments, and explicit limits on gearing constitute more direct means of controlling leverage.
13
Financial stability, in his opinion, could be preserved by directing policy instruments at debt gearing (or leverage) -and that with banks, "this could be achieved through a prevention in the initial (limited) fall in the value of assets and by ensuring that banks are able to withstand falls in asset values through sufficient loss absorbing capital -rather than expecting monetary policy (changes in interest rates) to substantially reduce asset price variability. He thereby, not only justifies his support for Basel III, but also thinks that time varying limits on gearing of financial firms (limits which could vary with asset prices and with the economic cycle) will contribute towards helping to maintain financial stability.
14 The Basel Committee also proposes the introduction of non risk based leverage ratios as supplementary measures to the Basel risk based framework. − The terms on which lending was provided to depository institutions (traditional borrowers) were eased quite dramatically.
− This was followed by the lowering of interest rate on discount window loans, an increase in their maturity, and, auctioned credit (aimed at reducing the stigma of borrowing from the window).
− Cooperative measures with foreign central banks through currency swaps (to make dollar funding available to banks operating abroad) also took place. 13 He however concedes that "simply because they are a more direct means to control leverage does not prove that capital requirements or limits to gearing are a far more effective tool to preserve financial stability than changing interest rates." He also provides at least two situations where the use of capital controls and limits on gearing might not be a very effective means of maintaining financial stability; ibid. The provision of extraordinary measures was also illustrated by the fact that for the first time since the 1930s, credit was extended to non depository institutions -as well as the grant of discount window access to primary dealers when it became evident that constraints on their access to liquidity threatened broader financial stability and economic activity.
D. Conclusion
The improvement of the quality and quantity of capital -both on a going and gone concern basis, as a means of improving loss absorbing characteristics, would not only reduce the potential for financial institutions to take excessive risks, reduce tax burdens on tax payers, it would also serve as an effective complement to monetary policy inititatives in preventing the fall in the value of assets.
Incentives which could serve in encouraging such financial institutions to withdraw from such policies, could accompany such exit strategies in the form of lower interest rate deals and packages to be offered to financial institutions -the level of such interest rates being dependent on the length of period during which such financial institutions applied for such liquidity assistance.
As the recent Crisis has demonstrated, systemic risks are closly linked to liquidity risks -hence maturity transformations and liquidity funding constitute important factors in determining the resilience of the financial system.
